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 Today it is a commonplace that the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities has played an indispensable role in the process of European 
legal integration. 
 The practice of the European Court, often described as activist, has re-
sulted in at least, two developments: (a) transformation of the original (treaty 
forged) relationship between national and European law, and (b) remodeling of 
the vertical separation of powers between the Union and its Member States.  
 These developments seem to be restrained by the reaction of some Mem-
ber States, acting on both, supranational and national level. 
 Supranational judicial activism developed in the European Union has 
threatened to jeopardize constitutional values of Member States and strip them 
off their residual powers. In other words, the European Court of Justice acts 
as a supranational counter-majoritarian force in respect of national legislatures. 
On the other hand, national courts, following the traditional reasoning infused 
with the concept of national sovereignty are reluctant to recognize the 
supremacy of supranational legal rules when they are at variance with national 
constitutional law. 
 It is suggested that the issue of legitimacy is of essential importance for 
the future of the European Union. However, one has to distinguish the 
sources of legitimacy of judicial and legislative branch. While the latter is 
derived from the democratic process, the former is derived from procedural 
and substantive justice. While legislative regulation reflects interests, judicial 
regulation is an expression of justice. In other words, the two branches of 
government are to certain extent incommensurable. That explains why the ECJ 
has retained its legitimacy even in the absence of democratic process. That 
also explains why the battle for supremacy has to be won not only on the 
legislative but also on the judicial ground. 
 
 I Introduction 
 Legal developments described in this paper are nothing new for schol-
ars of European Law. Today it is a commonplace that the Court of Jus-
tice of the European Communities has played an indispensable role in the 
 
 1This article represents a modified version of the author's paper presented at 
the conference on Amsterdam and Beyond: The European Union Facing the 
Challenges of the 21st Century, Brussels, July 9—12 1997. 
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process of European legal integration. It is widely agreed that its integra-
tive rhetoric was often based, not in the letter of the constituent treaties, 
but also in its spirit. Indeed, the so-called judicial activism of the Euro-
pean Court has managed to push European integration forward in the le-
gal arena even in those instances where political integration was stalled.  
 Activist practice of the European Court has resulted in at least, two 
developments: (a) transformation of the original (treaty forged) relationship 
between national and European law, and (b) remodeling of the vertical 
separation of powers between the Union and its Member States. 
 (a) European law overrides national law, even of Constitutional nature. 
That is the “rule of recognition” within the European union starting from 
Costa v. ENEL and Simmental cases. It is a common place that the 
original wording of the founding treaties (Article 189 EEC) has been ex-
tended to cover an ever larger set of supranational rules. Not only Treaty 
provisions and Regulations may have direct effect on national legal orders 
and supremacy over national legal rules, but the family of “higher norms” 
has been extended to cover Directives, both implemented, and unimple-
mented. In certain sense, judicial assertion of numerous “subjective supra-
national rights” has improved the legal status of individuals — however, 
without their political participation. 
 (b) Formally speaking, the principle of separation of powers either in 
horizontal or in vertical sense does not exist within European union. The 
founding treaties rather speak about “tasks” (Article 2 of the EC Treaty) 
and “activities” (Article 3 of the EC Treaty) of the European Communi-
ties. Those tasks are to be performed by the supranational institutions 
which lack the democratic legitimacy which is the characteristic of nation 
states based on popular sovereignty. The vertical separation of powers be-
tween the Community and its Member States has undergone a significant 
evolution. While in 1957 the European Court of Justice has clearly de-
fined the Community as one of limited and enumerated powers,2 today, it 
is widely agreed that the powers of Member States have no reserved 
status, and that the extension of supranational powers is not likely to be 
blocked by any constitutional guarantees.3 The described situation is due to 
several developments, such as the elaboration, by the European Court of 
Justice, of the doctrine of implied powers, illustrated by the landmark 
ERTA case4, the evolution of the doctrine of judicial pre-emption,5 and 
 
 2Cases 7/56, 3—7/57 Algera v. Common Assembly (1957) E.C.R. 39. 
 3Koen Lenaerts, Constitutionalism and the Many Faces of Federalism, 38 Am. 
J. Comp. L. (1990), 205, 220, et. seq. 
 4Case 22/70 Commission v. Council (1971) E.C.R. 263. 
 5See e.g. Denis Waelbroeck, The Emergent Doctrine of Community Pre-emption 
— Consent and Redelegation, in: Courts and Free Markets: Perspectives from the 
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by an extensive interpretation of the Founding Treaties, especially but not 
exclusively in the field of the interpretation of Articles 30—36 (Free 
Movement of Goods) as well as 85. and 86. (Competition) of the EC 
Treaty.6 
 Both developments seem to have reached their limits.  
 As far as the extension of the powers of the European Union is con-
cerned, it has been blocked by introducing the subsidiarity principle into 
the Maastricht treaty.  
 Second, certain developments related to the Maastricht Treaty indicate 
that an embryonic mechanism of checks and balances has developed in the 
European Union. It is evidenced by reversal of the S.P.U.C. v. Grogan 
decision of the European Court of Justice by a protocol to the Maastricht 
Treaty. 
 Third, supremacy of European Law in national legal systems, though 
theoretically unquestioned, has been put in question in the United King-
dom and Germany. In the United Kingdom the doctrine of Parliamentary 
supremacy leaves Parliament, at least in theory, at will to enact national 
legislation contrary to either primary or secondary Community law. In 
Germany, the supreme position of the European Court of Justice and its 
case law has been seriously undermined first by the Maastricht decision of 
the Constitutional Court and later by the developments in the Banana 
cases. 
 
 II. The Restraints 
 1. Subsidiarity 
 Despite its earlier presence in the Draft Treaty on European Union,7 
and even its legal expression in the Single European Act,8 the subsidiarity 
principle has been first comprehensively introduced to the body of Euro-
pean Law by articles 3b A(2) and B(2) of the Maastricht Treaty. The 
function of the Article 3b of the Maastricht Treaty seems to be analogous 
 
United States and Europe, Vol. II, Clarendon Press, Oxford (1982) at p. 548 et 
seq. 
 6On forms of judicial activism of the ECJ see. e.g. Hjaelte Rasmussen, On Law 
and Policy in the European Court of Justice. A Comparative Study in Judicial 
Policymaking, Nijhoff, Dordrecht, Boston, Lancaster, 1986; Joseph Weiler, The 
Transformation of Europe, 100 Yale L. J. (1991) 2403. 
 7Adopted by the European Parliament on February 14th 1984, O. J. 1984 C 
77/33, Article 12(2). 
 8Article 130r(4) which introduces subsidiarity principle in the area of 
environmental protection. 
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to the X Amendment to the US Constitution which allocates residual 
powers to the individual States and enumerated powers to the Federal 
Government. When discussing the issue of subsidiarity the most important 
question is whether it should be understood as a political concept or as a 
justiciable legal principle. So far it seems that the former view prevails, 
and that the subsidiarity clause of the Maastricht treaty is addressed to 
the legislative and not to the judicial branch.9 It is witnessed by the 
rather extensive definition enacted by the Protocol to the Draft Treaty of 
Amsterdam,10 on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and 
Proportionality. For all that can be said, the principle of subsidiarity re-
mains to be addressed to the Commission and the Council, and not to 
the judicial branch of the Union. 
 2. Checks and Balances 
 The other important limit to the judicial activism of the European 
Court of Justice originates from the persistence of some Member States to 
defend values of their constitutional order when put in question by the 
European Court of Justice. In 1991 the European Court of Justice was 
seised with the S.P.U.C. v. Grogan case11 and had to decide whether Irish 
public authorities can restrict advertising, in Ireland, of the medical 
termination of pregnancy in other Member States. In a broader perspec-
tive, the issue was whether to give precedence to a protected value of 
Irish constitutional law (right to life of unborn (Art. 40 section 3 of the 
Irish Constitution)) or to one of the market freedoms protected by the 
Founding treaties. The ECJ has made a first step by defining the medical 
termination of pregnancy as a service, but has stopped short of giving 
precedence to the freedom of movement of services by avoiding the whole 
issue. As a consequence, Irish Constitution was to be applied in respect of 
non-economic operators, but it was left open what would have happened if 
abortion had been advertised by economic subjects. In its subsequent case 
law the Irish Supreme Court has repeatedly accepted the supremacy of 
Community Law in Ireland. It has also accepted the definition of abortion 
as “services.”12  
 
 9For the U.K. see e.g. House of Lords Select Committee on the European 
Communities, Report on Economic and Monetary Union and Political Union. 
Session 1989—90 27th Report (1990), London, H.M.S.O. at p. 55; for Germany see 
e.g. Vlad Constantinesco, Who is Afraid of Subsidiarity, 11 Y. B. Eur. L. (1991) 
33, 38—39. 
 10Draft Treaty of Amsterdam presented to the Conference of the 
Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, Brussels, June 19th 
1997. 
 11Case C-159/90, Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland LTD. 
(S.P.U.C.) v. Stephen Grogan and Others (1991), Common Mkt. L. Rep. 849. 
 12Case Attorney General v. X and Others (1992), Common Mkt. L. Rep. 277, 
point (32). 
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 However, it seems that the effects of the ECJ's decision in the Grogan 
case have been reversed by the Protocol annexed to the Treaty on Euro-
pean Union and to the Treaties Establishing the European Communities. 
13 According to the said protocol, “(n)othing in the Treaty on European 
Union, or in the Treaties establishing the European Communities, or in 
the Treaties or Acts modifying or supplementing those Treaties, shall af-
fect the application in Ireland of Article 40.3.3. of the Constitution of 
Ireland.” The said protocol can mean only that prior to its enactment, the 
application of the Irish Constitution in Ireland was not taken for granted. 
Yet, it excludes interpretation to that effect and re-establishes the 
supremacy of the Irish Constitution. Similarly to the United States situa-
tion, where the rulings of the Supreme Court can be reversed by the 
Constitutional Amendment14 the Protocol has blocked the effects of the 
ECJ decision in the Grogan case. However, unlike the United States, the 
mechanism of checks and balances has developed without the participation 
of the electorate. 
 It can be seen that so far, judicial activism of the ECJ purporting to 
strip the Member States of their regulatory competencies can be curbed 
by the Member States, acting on supranational level. However, such action 
requires investing of it significant efforts and incurs high decision-making 
costs.15 Therefore is not reasonable to expect the same kind of long term 
effective opposition to ECJ's activist decisions. 
 3. National Checks on Supranational Supremacy 
 But has the supremacy of European Law ever been taken for granted 
in some Member States? In the United Kingdom in runs against the well 
settled dogma of Parliamentary Sovereignty as defined by Coke, Blackstone 
and Dicey.16 Coupled with the dualist understanding of the relationship 
between international and national law, that doctrine, according to the 
prevailing position of the courts, ever since the enactment of the 1972 
European Communities Act, grants precedence to both primary and sec-
ondary Community law, in absence of a Parliamentary declaration to the 
 
 13Treaty of European Union, Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities, Luxembourg, 1992, at p. 205. 
 14In fact that has occurred four times for that purpose. See. e.g. Burton Caine, 
Judicial Review — Democracy Versus Constitutionality, 56 Temple L. Q. 2 (1983), 
297, 330. 
 15See e.g. James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent, 
University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1974. 
 16See e.g. W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 16th edition, 
Butterworths, 1825., Vol. I, Book 2, pp. 160, 161; H.W.R. Wade, The Basis of 
Legal Sovereignty (1955), C.L.J. at p. 172. 
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contrary.17 Though subsequent case law has shown that the disapplication 
of an act of Parliament and the application of legal rules of European 
law is possible (Factortame I18 and Factortame II19), the basic dogma of 
Parliamentary supremacy seems to remain intact. The Parliament may, by 
express words, always set European Law aside. In absence of such express 
words, European law may have precedence over national law.20 
 While in the United Kingdom, European law is granted supremacy until 
the Parliament decides to the Contrary, in Germany limits have been set 
by the Federal Constitutional Court. There the issue has been raised 
whether the European Court of Justice, when developing European law, 
has ensured the preservation of “certain unalienable Rights in the compa-
rable manner as it is the case in Germany. Or, in other words, is it le-
gitimate for national authorities, particularly courts, to deny precedence to 
European legal rules violating unalienable fundamental rights? 
 Certainly since the early Stauder v. Ulm case,21 the European Union 
deems itself bound by fundamental human rights, and the legal basis for 
their protection originates from several sources.22 However, the question is 
whether higher national standards of protection of fundamental rights can 
justify a departure of the principle of the supremacy of European Law.23  
 
 17See e.g. cases Blackburn v. Attorney General (1971), W.L.R. 1037 (C.A.); 
McWhirter v. Attorney-General (1972) Common Mkt. L. Rep. 882; and especially 
Lord Denning's obiter dictum in McCarhys v. Smith (1979), I.C.R. 785; (1978) 
W.L.R. 849: “If the time should come when our Parliament deliberately passes an 
Act — with the intention of repudiating the Treaty or any provision in it — or 
intentionally of acting inconsistently with it — and says so in express terms — 
then I should have thought that it would be the duty of our Courts to follow the 
statute of our Parliament.” 
 18Case R. v. Secretary of State for Transport ex Parte Factortame Ltd., (1989) 
2 Common Mkt. L. Rep. 353; 2 W.L.R. 997 (H.L.). 
 19Factortame Ltd. v. Secretary of State for Transport (No. 2) (1991) All E. R. 
70. 
 20See e.g. P.P. Craig, Sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament After 
Factortame, 11 Y.B. Eur. L. 221 (1991) at p. 234; Philip Allott, Parliamentary 
Sovereignty — from Austin to Hart, 49 Cambridge L. J. 377, 380 (1990). 
 21Case 29/69, Stauder v. City of Ulm, Sozialamt, (1969) E.C.R. 419. 
 22Henry G. Schermers, The European Communities Bound by Fundamental 
Human Rights, 27 Common Mkt. L. Rev. (1990), 249; See also Antonio Cassesse, 
Andrew Clapham and Joseph Weier (eds.), Human Rights and the European 
Community, Vol. II, Methods of Protection, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-
Baden, 1991. 
 23As it reads in the great American Declaration of Independence: “That to 
secure these Rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just 
Powers from the Consent of the Governed, that whenever any Form of 
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 Probably the strongest constitutional assertion of fundamental rights can 
be found in German constitutional order. An extensive Constitutional set 
of guarantees of fundamental rights and their broad interpretation by the 
Federal Constitutional Court have set the stage for the battle for judicial 
supremacy between the Bundesverfassungsgericht and the European Court 
of Justice. 
 Following the landmark Maastricht decision24 of the Federal Constitu-
tional Court, as well as its previous case law on the point, and especially 
the decisions in the cases Solange I25 and Solange II26, the relationship 
between German and European law is the following: As long as the stan-
dards of protection of fundamental rights on European level are substan-
tially comparable to the ones in Germany, the Federal Constitutional 
Court shall no longer review community law as to its compliance with the 
Constitutional guarantees of fundamental rights. However, if the European 
Court of Justice or any other body of the Union extends the meaning of 
European Law so that it is not covered with the German act of ratifica-
tion, respective legal acts shall have no application in Germany.27 As a 
consequence the Federal Constitutional Court shall first look whether cer-
tain piece of European legislation is covered by the ratification act, and if 
it is, whether the supranational standards of protection of fundamental 
rights are substantially similar to German ones. Ultimately, European law 
is granted supremacy in Germany, unless ultra vires and as long as the 
standards of the protection of fundamental rights are respected. The de-
scribed interpretation of the Federal Constitutional Court is subject to a 
lively debate in Germany, since it clearly contradicts to the position of the 
European Court of Justice which deems European Law absolutely 
supreme.28 
 An occurrence of one of the mentioned situations has until recently 
been deemed purely theoretical. However the unfolding “Bananas Saga” 
 
Government becomes destructive of these Ends, it is the Right of the People to 
alter or to abolish it...”. 
 24BVerfGE 89, 155. 
 25BVerfGE 37,271. 
 26BVerfGE 73, 339. 
 27Würden etwa europäische Einrichtungen oder Organe den Unions-Vertrag in 
einer Weise handhaben oder fortbilden, die von dem Vertrag, wie er dem 
deutschen Zustimmungsgesetz zugrundeliegt, nicht mehr gedeckt wäre, so wären die 
daraus hervorgehenden Rechtsakte im deutschen Hoheitsbereich nicht verbindlich. 
BVerfGE 89, 155 (188). 
 28For the critique of the Maastricht decision see e.g. J. A. Frowein, Das 
Maastricht-Urteil und die Grenzen der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit, 54 ZaöRV (1994), 
1. 
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has shed some new light on the Maastricht Judgment.29 Theoretical checks 
to the supremacy of European law have been transformed into practice. 
According to the obiter dictum of the Federal Constitutional court, “it 
may not be excluded that the competent courts may temporarily suspend 
the application of the provisions of the Regulation...”30 In pursuance of 
the Maastricht decision of the BVerfGE the Finanzgericht Hamburg held 
that “even if the Bananas Regulation was declared valid under Community 
law, the question would arise whether it is applicable without reserve in 
Germany.”31 
 
 III. The Diagnosis 
 The central position of the judiciary as a corrective of the majoritarian 
democracy lies in the essence of the liberal political thought. Mill's obser-
vation that federal courts may replace traditional methods of dispute set-
tlement (diplomacy and war) is valid for both the United States and the 
European Union.32 However, it seems that at the end of the 20th century 
the judiciary is by no means the least dangerous branch in Hamiltonian 
sense.33 While in the United States the Constitution is subject to 
“amendment” through the “agency of judicial decision”34, in the European 
Union supranational judicial activism has threatened to jeopardize constitu-
tional values of Member States and strip them off their residual powers. 
In other words, the European Court of Justice acts as a supranational 
counter-majoritarian force in respect of national legislatures.35  
 On the other hand, national courts, following the traditional reasoning 
impregnated with the concept of national sovereignty are reluctant to rec-
ognize absolute supremacy to supranational legal rules when it comes in 
conflict with national constitutional law. The European Court of Justice — 
 
 29See eg. U. Everling, Will Europe slip on Bananas? The Bananas judgement 
of the Court of Justice and national courts, 33 Common Mkt. L. Rev. (1996), 401; 
Manfred Zuleeg, Bananen und Grundrechte — Anlaß zum Konflikt zwischen 
europäischer und deutscher Gerichtsbarkeit, NJW (1997), 1201. 
 30Everling, at p. 432. 
 31Id. at 433. 
 32J. S. Mill, O federalnim predstavni~kim vladavinama, Izabrani politi~ki spisi, 
second volume, Informator, Zagreb, 1989, at p. 171. 
 33Hamilton, Federalist LXXVIII. 
 34Horace A Davis, The Judicial Veto, Da Capo Press, New York, 1971 at p. 1. 
 35In other words the counter-majoritarian difficulty appears on the vertical axis. 
See e.g. A. M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch, Bobbs Merril, Indianapolis, 
1962. 
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a body lacking democratic legitimacy — is understood as an inappropriate 
instance to curb the national constituent power. 
 In effect, individuals in Member States of the European Union have 
found themselves in an environment where the democratic process has 
very little to do with the protection of individual rights (on supranational 
level). In fact, we are witnessing the competition between two different 
sources of legitimacy: national governments derive their legitimacy from 
democratic process, supranational authorities, from judicial protection of 
individual rights. Individuals shall be prepared to pledge their loyalty to 
the Union to the extent in which their rights are better protected by su-
pranational legal rules. Otherwise, in an absence of “voice”, the remaining 
alternative is an “exit.”36 
 
 IV. The Cure? 
 The classical remedy for the described situation says that the loyalty of 
citizens to the supranational Union can be attracted only by providing for 
a source of legitimacy. On the national level that source is the democratic 
process which provides legitimacy for all branches of government, including 
the counter-majoritarian judicial branch. By analogy the same principle 
should be applied on the supranational level by granting the European 
Parliament ever stronger powers that what would ultimately lead to its 
transformation into a fully-fledged parliamentary house. That path has been 
followed in the past, but the final step has never been made. Unlike the 
original design of the European Parliament, today its representatives are 
directly elected, the Parliament can pass the motion of censure to the 
Commission and has veto power in certain areas of regulation. Ultimately, 
it would transform the Union into a Federal Union.  
 The solutions proposed by the Draft Amsterdam Treaty, by and large, 
follow the same direction. It is generally recognised that the European 
Parliament is the overall winner in the supranational power play. The 
Parliament has gained new competencies and strenghtened its position in 
the co-decision procedure with the Council. Maybe the most significant 
gain is the fact that following the unsucessful outcome of bargaining in 
the conciliation committee, the Council may not push its original common 
position forward. This change in the co-decision procedure has provided 
the Parliament with a right of veto in the areas of regulation subject to 
the co-decision procedure.  
 The remaining question remains to what extent it is to expect the 
Council of Ministers to give away its regulatory powers. A further devel-
 
 36I. e. pledging loyalty rather to national then supranational government. Cf. A. 
O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty — Responses to Decline in Firms, 
Organizations and States (1970). 
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opment of instruments of parliamentary control and an enhanced partici-
pation of the European Parliament in the supranational regulatory process 
automatically leads to the loss of the power of national executives in their 
respective Member States. Also, the strenghtening of powers of the Euro-
pean Parliament leads to the further affirmation of certain federal princi-
ples, primarily effective37 representation of individuals on suprana-
tional/federal level.38 Indeed, the fathers of the Maastricht Treaty were 
careful enough to avoid even mentioning the word “federalism.” Alto-
gether, it seems to me that the transformation of the Parliament into a 
genuine legislative body would amount to a constitutional revolution which 
is not likely to be forged without serious problems.  
 Another proposal seeks to provide for legitimacy of supranational judi-
cial review which would put an end to the recurrent challenges to the su-
premacy of European law on grounds of the protection of fundamental 
rights. In his recent paper J. H. H. Weiler has proposed the creation of 
a supranational Constitutional Council which would, following the French 
design, have jurisdiction only over issues of competencies, and would de-
cide cases submitted to it after a law had been adopted but before com-
ing into force.39 While the proposal sounds reasonable in the context of 
conflict over competences which is unfolding between high national courts 
and the European Court of Justice, it does not appear to me that it 
would solve the problem of legitimacy. At present, the European Court of 
Justice is prompted to interpret European law in favor of individuals 
(though it is questionable whether it does so all the time)40 if it wishes 
to attract their supranational loyalty. Its legitimacy is based on the respect 
for fundamental and other individual rights and their efficient and actual 
protection. The whole reasoning of the German Federal Constitutional 
Court in Solange cases is built on that proposition. It has also been sug-
gested that strict standards followed by the Federal Constitutional Court 
have prompted the ECJ to develop and strengthen its own standards of 
protection. The proposed Constitutional Council, once it decides that the 
ECJ has jurisdiction in certain matter would, on the one hand provide for 
a green light to the ECJ to solve the case regardless of such concerns, 
and on the other hand put an end to the “German challenge.” Never-
 
 37I.e. representation granting the individuals its substantive traditional 
characteristics — participation in the law-making process. 
 38Federal principles are understood in Elazar's sense. See e.g. Daniel J. Elazar, 
Exploring Federalism, The University of Alabama Press, Tuscalosa, 1987. 
 39J. H. H. Weiler, The European Union Belongs to its Citizens: Three 
Immodest Proposals, 22 Eur. L. Rev. (1997), 150, 155. 
 40Coppel and O'Neill, The European Court of Justice: taking rights seriously?, 
29 Common Mkt. L. Rev., 669; See also Weiler and Lockhart, Taking Rights 
seriously seriously. The European Court and its fundamental rights jurisprudence, 
32 Common Mkt L. Rev., 51 and 579. 
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theless, if the German Constitutional Court is right in its assessment that 
standards of protection on supranational level may be lower than those in 
Germany, something obviously has to be done about it, since there is a 
little doubt that legitimacy and loyalty pertain to the one who protects 
individual rights better. Accession of the Union to the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights could be a solution. That is however, an entirely 
new problem which can not be discussed at this place.  
 Nevertheless, the crucial question for the future of the European Union 
remains to be the one of legitimacy. However, one has to distinguish the 
sources of legitimacy of judicial and legislative branch. While the latter is 
derived from the democratic process, the former is derived from 
procedural and substantive justice. While legislative regulation reflects in-
terests, judicial regulation is an expression of justice. In other words, the 
two branches of government are to a certain extent incommensurable. That 
explains why the ECJ has retained its legitimacy even in the absence of 
democratic process. That also explains why the battle for supremacy has to 
be won not only on the legislative but also on the judicial ground. In 
that sense the intergovernmental conference has little to do with the 
relationship of national and supranational judiciary. That battle will have 
to be fought not in the lobbies of interest, but in the halls of justice. 
 
Translated by the author 
 
 
 
